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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the extent to which the transfer of exclusive competence over 
foreign direct investment to the European Union (EU) in the Treaty of Lisbon allows it to 
become a strong actor in the international investment arena. Drawing on legal and 
international political economy concepts, it challenges a widespread assumption 
according to which an exclusive EU competence would benefit not only its economic 
competitiveness but also increase the attractiveness of its regulatory system. Legal 
and political problems, arising from the limits to the EU’s competence in Union law and 
from its awkward interaction with international investment law, limit its ability to 
negotiate favourable international investment agreements and imply that the EU’s 
role in this field is unlikely to come to parallel its salient position in trade. Indeed, the 
transfer of competence might give rise to a paradoxical situation in which the EU’s 
international bargaining position is weakened not only in investment but also in 
international economic policy-making more broadly regarded. 
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Introduction: A new exclusive competence for the European Union 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly relevant internationally as a means of 
linking markets in a globalised economy and trading system. It is also, pursuant to 
Article 207(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a 
component of the European Union’s (EU) Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which 
falls within the Union’s exclusive competence as per Article 3(1)(e) TFEU.1 This transfer 
of competence that the Treaty of Lisbon made to the Union, the first source and 
recipient of both capital and investment worldwide, has the potential to give rise to 
systemic shifts in the international investment landscape.2 As such, it has been hailed 
by policy-makers and academics alike as a feat which would not only benefit the 
Union in economic terms but also permit the accomplishment of a position in the 
international investment landscape to parallel its role in the international trade arena, 
in which the EU is generally regarded as an effective actor or even a ‘market power’, 
with a strong and ambitious role supported internally by its exclusive competence and 
externally both by the size of its market and by the difficulties which its many veto 
players create for the acquiescence to concessions in international negotiations.3 
 
This paper questions an assumption which until today has been taken at face value 
by both academics and policy-makers, namely that the competence transfer would 
strengthen the EU’s competitive position and bargaining power in international 
investment politics. Its approach draws both on legal and political economy 
perspectives, in particular from the concepts of actorness and coherence, which 
allow for an assessment of the extent to which the transfer of competence over FDI to 
the EU executed by the Treaty of Lisbon allows the Union to become a competitive 
international actor in international investment politics. In this context, competitiveness 
                                                 
1 C. Brown & I. Naglis, “Dispute Settlement in Future EU Investment Agreements”, in M. 
Bungenberg, A. Reinisch & C. Tietje (eds.), EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions 
and Remaining Challenges, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013, p. 21. 
2 S. Meunier, “Integration by Stealth: How the European Union Gained Competence over 
Foreign Direct Investment”, EUI Working Papers, no. 66, 2014, p. 1. 
3 For an economic analysis of the consequences of competence transfer, see for instance K. 
Blomkvist, “The Impact of a Common EU FDI Approach on Individual Member States and 
Overall EU Competitiveness”, Paper presented at the 13th annual SNEE European Integration 
Conference, 17-20 May 2011, pp. 12-14; for the concept ‘market power’, see C. Damro, 
“Market Power Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 5, 2012, p. 682; see also 
R. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, 1988, pp. 437-438; A. Young, “The Rise (and Fall?) of the EU’s 
Performance in the Multilateral Trading System”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 33, no. 6, 
2011, pp. 719-723. 
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is understood as the relative efficiency of an economy in achieving specific results, a 
concept which in this paper is applied to the EU’s ability to conclude international 
investment agreements (IIA).4 A well-known conceptualisation of actorness, upon 
which this paper is based, is proposed by Jupille and Caporaso, for whom an 
international actor is an entity which possesses authority or legal competence to take 
action internationally; is autonomous or institutionally distinct; is cohesive or able to 
frame and convey consistent policy preferences; and is recognised internationally.5 
 
After an overview of the economic and political economy reasons which were 
employed to justify the competence transfer, this paper will analyse the EU’s actorness 
in terms of its legal competence, its institutional autonomy and cohesion, and finally 
its international recognition, examining in each case the implications of the 
competence transfer for the EU’s ability to negotiate internationally on FDI. It argues 
that, regardless of its theoretical benefits, the distribution of competences enshrined 
in the Treaty of Lisbon, together with the EU’s own development of its policy and the 
constraints set by existing international investment policy and law, thwart its possibilities 
of becoming a strong, coherent international actor in the international investment 
regime. Paraphrasing former Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, the strictures which still 
limit the EU’s competence imply that, far from allowing it to become a ‘market power’ 
in international investment as it is in trade, the EU’s post-Lisbon position in the 
international investment regime is more reminiscent of what one might term a ‘Pastis 
power’ whose potentially massive influence is decisively ‘clouded’ by the internal limits 
to its competence and by the external environment in which it must find a place.6 
 
                                                 
4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: Towards a comprehensive 
European international investment policy, COM(2010) 343 final, Brussels, 7 July 2010, p. 7; A. 
Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 230; J. Griebel, 
“The New EU Investment Policy Approach”, in M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel, S. Hobe & A. Reinisch 
(eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, p. 309; S. Rao 
& P. Sharma, “International Competitiveness and Regulatory Framework: A Canadian 
Perspective”, in J. Curtis & A. Sydor (eds.), NAFTA at 10, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 2006, p. 213. 
5 L. Greiçevci, “EU Actorness in International Affairs: The Case of EULEX Mission in Kosovo”, 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 12, no. 3, 2011, pp. 286-287; J. Jupille & J. 
Caporaso, “States, Agency and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics”, in 
C. Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998, 
pp. 214, 216. 
6 See P. Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade, “The Convention and trade policy: concrete 
steps to enhance the EU’s international profile”, Speech, Brussels, 5 February 2002, p. 3: “under 
the Pastis principle, a little drop of unanimity can taint the entire glass of QMV [qualified majority 
voting] water”. 
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Accounting for the competence transfer: counting chickens before they are 
hatched? 
 
A series of economic and political economy arguments have been invoked to support 
the extension of EU competence to FDI, many of which were advanced by the 
European Commission in its long-lasting attempts to encourage a competence 
transfer.7 The economic arguments are related to the alleged benefits for both home 
and host economies which mainstream economic theory ascribes to international 
investment, linked first and foremost to the creation of scale economies, the 
strengthening of productivity and competitiveness, and the general increase of 
welfare. The political economy arguments can be driven back to the strengthening of 
the EU’s actorness and bargaining power in the international investment arena.8 
 
First, the fact that investment is increasingly interlinked with and even replacing other 
forms of trade would imply that competence over investment has become a 
precondition for effective action in international economic policy. This point is 
rendered even more significant by the increasing relevance of investment in 
international trade negotiations and in the context of the diminishing role of individual 
EU member states in an international landscape ever more populated by new centres 
of economic power with which they must increasingly compete.9 
 
Second, the establishment of unified standards, rules, and procedures in a cohesive 
Common Investment Policy (CIP) streamlining 28 conflicting jurisdictions would 
increase transparency. It would also improve policy coherence and increase the EU’s 
attractiveness as a host and its competitiveness as a source of investment, not only by 
                                                 
7 For a historical overview, see Meunier, op.cit. 
8 J. Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2nd edn., Reading, Addison-
Wesley, 1993, pp. 315-317; M. Bungenberg & S. Hobe, “The Relationship of International 
Investment Law and European Union Law”, in M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel, S. Hobe & A. Reinisch 
(eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, p.1604; G. 
Navaretti & A. Venables, Multinational Firms in the World Economy, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2004, pp. 39-48; S. Woolcock, The EU’s Approach to International Investment 
Policy after the Lisbon Treaty, Study PE 433.854-855-856 Brussels, European Parliament 
Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, October 2010, p. 16. On the EU’s 
approach, see for instance European Commission, Towards a comprehensive European 
international investment policy, op.cit., pp. 2-3, 8; European Commission, Communication from 
the Commission: Trade for All: Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy, 
COM(2015) 0497 final, Brussels, 14 October 2015, pp. 8-10. 
9 Bungenberg & Hobe, op.cit., p. 1604; Meunier, op.cit., p. 3; J. Terhechte, “Art. 351 TFEU, the 
Principle of Loyalty and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties”, in 
M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel & S. Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, 
Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2011, p. 79; Woolcock, op.cit., p. 10. 
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permitting for IIA negotiations with as many states simultaneously but also by lowering 
administrative costs for EU and third-country investors.10 Moreover, the CIP would 
significantly strengthen the EU’s negotiating power and give it a scale advantage in 
comparison to its member states individually considered.11 The EU could make use of 
this leverage in international negotiations to obtain more favourable market access 
and protection conditions for its investors, improving their competitiveness and their 
position in the international investment playing field.12 The new competence would 
thus allow the EU to punch at its weight in multilateral as well as bilateral and regional 
negotiations, promoting not only its economic interests but also its regulatory regime 
and putting an end to a situation in which it had lagged behind other economies 
which had achieved an agenda-setting and policy-shaping role in the global 
investment regime.13 
 
Third, by extending the same rights and obligations to all EU investors, the CIP would 
diminish substantial inequality between member states with different economic and 
regulatory configurations and thus limit competitive distortions within the internal 
market which result from inter-member state competition to attract FDI, levelling the 
playing field between them and benefiting in particular investors from countries with 
less extensive IIA networks.14 
 
The EU’s increased leverage in international negotiations would allow it not only to 
boost its international competitiveness but also promote its values and consolidate its 
actorness in international investment negotiations, with the potential to shape not only 
member-state and third-country approaches but also the international investment 
                                                 
10 M. Burgstaller, “The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties of EU Member States”, in M. 
Bungenberg, J. Griebel & S. Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, Berlin 
and Heidelberg, Springer, 2011, p. 70; Woolcock, op.cit., p. 17. 
11 M. Bungenberg, “The Division of Competences between the EU and its Member States in the 
Area of Investment Politics”, in M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel & S. Hindelang (eds.), International 
Investment Law and EU Law, Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2011, pp. 36, 41. 
12 J. Chaisse, “Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment–How 
will the New EU Competence on FDI affect the Emerging Global Regime?”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, vol. 15, no. 1, 2012, p. 53; C. Hermann, “Die Zukunft der 
mitgliedsstaatlichen Investitionspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon“, Europäische Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht, vol. 21, no. 6, 2010, p. 210; Woolcock, op.cit., p. 17. 
13 Chaisse, op.cit., pp. 52-53; Woolcock, op.cit., p. 17. 
14 Burgstaller, op.cit., p. 70; J. Griebel, “The New Great Challenge after the Entry into Force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon: Bringing about a Multilateral EU-Investment Treaty”, in M. Bungenberg, J. 
Griebel & S. Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, Berlin and Heidelberg, 
Springer, 2011, pp. 139-140; Woolcock, op.cit., p. 17. 
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regime overall.15 For instance, the EU’s weight in the global investment landscape 
could permit the multilateralisation of its bi- and plurilateral agreements, while its 
distinctively high standards and consideration of non-economic and equity objectives 
could make its approach a standard of international best practice.16 Ultimately, this 
increased international leverage might allow it to achieve its long-standing aim of 
concluding a multilateral investment framework within the World Trade Organisation.17 
 
The remainder of this paper will assess the extent to which such expectations have 
been fulfilled by the transfer of competence over FDI to the EU. It argues that these 
theoretical benefits are currently overridden by the distribution of competences 
enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, by the EU’s practical operationalisation of its new 
competence, and by its trouble finding a place in the international investment regime 
itself. 
 
Authority: redefining exclusivity 
 
The EU’s legal competence to act 
 
This section considers the extent of and limits to the EU’s exclusive power, that is, in 
Jupille and Caporaso’s terms, its ‘authority’ in the international investment policy field. 
It analyses the dispositions in EU primary law and their interpretation by EU institutions, 
particularly the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). 
 
The EU’s competence in international investment covers FDI, a term which the Treaty 
of Lisbon employs in Articles 206 and 207 TFEU but neither defines nor circumscribes.18 
Nevertheless, a binding characterisation seems to have emerged, particularly in light 
of the jurisprudence of the CJEU and EU secondary law, which draws on internationally 
widespread definitions such as those advanced by the Organisation for Economic 
                                                 
15 M. Götz, “Pursuing FDI Policy in the EU – Member States and Their Policy Space”, Journal of 
Economics and Political Economy, vol. 2, no. 2, 2015, pp. 295-296, 299-300; Bungenberg & 
Hobe, op.cit., p. 1610. 
16 Götz, op.cit., p. 300. 
17 Woolcock, op.cit., p. 13. 
18 Chaisse, op.cit., p. 57. 
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Cooperation and Development or the International Monetary Fund.19 FDI can 
consequently be understood as a long-term investment by an enterprise in a third 
country which confers lasting interest and managerial control to the investor.20 By 
linking the concept of FDI to the achievement of control or influence in the enterprise, 
the EU maintains a distinction which, while traditional in the economic and legal 
literatures, is not employed in practice in IIAs: it differentiates FDI from foreign portfolio 
investment (FPI), the short-term cross-border placement of private equity which 
focusses on the rate of financial return alone.21 Member states have actively opposed 
the Commission’s claim that competence over FDI implies competence over its less-
intrusive cousin FPI, and this choice seems to have been accepted overall by 
academia and policy-makers as denoting that FPI remains an area of shared 
competence.22 Nevertheless, the desire to conclude comprehensive EU IIAs has 
meant that such agreements are in practice likely to contain broad, asset-based 
definitions of investment which include both FDI and FPI. Hence, EU IIAs shall in practice 
be concluded as mixed agreements.23 This requirement imposes the use of a lengthy 
and complex decision-making procedure which is unlikely to strengthen the EU’s 
actorness in international investment politics, as we shall see henceforth.24 Moreover, 
the vague definition of FDI enshrined in the Treaties also implies that legal uncertainty 
                                                 
19 Bungenberg & Hobe, op.cit., p. 1612; Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988, for the 
implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union, L178/5, 8 July 
1988, Annex I; European Court of Justice, judgement in Commission of the European 
Communities v. Kingdom of Spain, C-463/00, 2003, ECR I-4581, para. 53; International Monetary 
Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6th edn., Washington 
D.C., IMF, 2013, pp. 100-102; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 4th edn., Paris, OECD, 2008, p. 17; A. 
Reinisch, “The Division of Powers between the EU and its Member States ‘After Lisbon’”, in M. 
Bungenberg, J. Griebel & S. Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, Berlin 
and Heidelberg, Springer, 2011, p. 46. 
20 Bungenberg & Hobe, op.cit., p. 1612; Burgstaller, op.cit., p. 62. 
21 Bungenberg & Hobe, op.cit., p. 1612; F. Hoffmeister & G. Ünüvar, “From BITS and Pieces 
towards European Investment Agreements”, in M. Bungenberg, A. Reinisch & C. Tietje (eds.), 
EU and Investment Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2013, p. 66; European Court of Justice, judgement in Commission of the European 
Communities v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04, 2006, ECR-
2008 I-9141, para. 19; P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, 2nd edn., Oxford and 
Portland, Hart, 2006, p. 47; Reinisch, “The Division of Powers”, op.cit., p. 46; P. Strik, Shaping the 
Single European Market in the Field of Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford, Hart, 2014, p. 12. 
22 Chaisse, op.cit., p. 58; Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, op.cit., pp. 78, 123; European 
Commission, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, op.cit., p. 8; 
Hoffmeister & Ünüvar, op.cit., p. 66; Koutrakos, op.cit., p. 47. 
23 J. Griebel, “The New EU Investment Policy Approach”, in M. Bungenberg, J. Griebel, S. Hobe 
& A. Reinisch (eds.), International Investment Law: A Handbook, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2015, 
p. 314. 
24 Reinisch, “The Division of Powers”, op.cit., p. 49; Terhechte, op.cit., pp. 92-93. 
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is likely to subsist, not only for the EU’s third-country IIA counterparties but crucially also 
within the Union itself.25 
 
Furthermore, this differentiation impacts not only the negotiation of EU IIAs but also the 
regulation of investment within the EU: differing governance mechanisms may give rise 
not only to inconsistent international negotiations but also inconsistent policy-making 
within the EU. They may discourage investment outright by giving rise to diverging 
degrees of market access and differing investment regulation and protection 
processes and standards. This may increase legal uncertainty and complexity for 
investors, who in practice do not tend to differentiate between FDI and FPI.26 It seems 
that far from creating a ‘one-stop’ policy area streamlining 28 conflicting jurisdictions 
with contradictory aims and approaches, the competence transfer has in practice 
achieved the opposite effect by adding yet another level of policy- and decision-
making to an already crowded policy field, with a potentially negative bearing on the 
EU’s attractiveness as a source and host for investment and as a partner in IIA 
negotiations. 
 
Limits to the EU’s competence 
 
The Union’s exclusive competence over FDI is limited by EU primary law in two ways. A 
first set of limitations arises from the doctrine of parallelism: the EU’s exclusive 
competence does not extend to areas in which it is not exclusively competent under 
EU internal market law, such as transport (Article 207(5-6) TFEU).27 Secondly, its 
competence in investment protection is limited pursuant to Article 345 TFEU, according 
to which it cannot “prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of 
property ownership”. This implies that member states remain competent to decide on 
nationalisation and privatisation of property. Nevertheless, CJEU jurisprudence has 
considered that the definition of the conditions which justify expropriation is a matter 
of investment regulation and thus of EU competence.28 For this reason, the EU has 
tended to employ the investment protection provisions in its IIAs not only to ring-fence 
                                                 
25 Burgstaller, op.cit., p. 70. 
26 Woolcock, op.cit., p. 12. 
27 Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, op.cit., pp. 96, 98. 
28 Ibid., p. 338. 
Paloma Díaz Topete 
11 
the prerogative to expropriate of the EU’s third-country counterparties, but also that 
of its own member states.29 
 
Nevertheless, limits arise not only from EU primary law but also from its interpretation. A 
paradigmatic example in this regard is that of investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS). 
In line with their mainstream economic reasoning, most EU institutions, that is the 
Commission, the Council and even, albeit with reservations, the European Parliament, 
have defended the use of ISDS: they consider it to be not only a necessary element of 
comprehensive investment protection – for instance because it would allegedly 
depoliticise conflicts by removing the host state’s direct influence and increase the 
speed of procedures and enforceability of awards – but also crucial to maintain the 
EU’s international economic and regulatory competitiveness.30 This notion was 
encapsulated by a 2010 Communication by the European Commission, which 
considered ISDS to be “such an established feature of investment agreements that its 
absence would in fact discourage investors and make a host economy less attractive 
than others”.31 
 
                                                 
29 J. Basedow, The European Union’s International Investment Policy: Explaining Intensifying 
Member State Cooperation in International Investment Regulation, PhD thesis, London, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2014, p. 60. 
30 T. Braun, “For a Complementary European Investment Protection”, in M. Bungenberg, J. 
Griebel & S. Hindelang (eds.), International Investment Law and EU Law, Berlin and Heidelberg, 
Springer, 2011, p. 96; Brown & Naglis, op.cit., pp. 18, 27; Council of the European Union, 
“Conclusions on a Comprehensive European international Investment Policy”, 3041st Foreign 
Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 25 October 2010, para. 18; European Commission, 
Recommendation from the Commission to the Council on the modification of the negotiating 
directives for an Economic Integration Agreement with Canada in order to authorise the 
Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Union, on investment, 12838/11 EXT 2, Brussels, 
European Commission, 14 July 2011, p. 5; European Parliament, “Resolution on the future 
European International Investment Policy”, Official Journal of the European Union, C296E, 2 
October 2012, para. 32; S. Hindelang, “The Autonomy of the European Legal Order”, in M. 
Bungenberg & C. Herrmann (eds.), Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon, Berlin and 
Heidelberg, Springer, 2013, p. 187; N. Lavranos, “Designing an International Investor-to-State 
Arbitration System after Opinion 1/09”, in M. Bungenberg & C. Herrmann (eds.), Common 
Commercial Policy after Lisbon, Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2013, pp. 201-204; S. Schill, 
“Luxembourg Limits: Conditions for Investor-State Dispute Settlement under future EU 
Investment Agreements”, in M. Bungenberg, A. Reinisch & C. Tietje (eds.), EU and Investment 
Agreements: Open Questions and Remaining Challenges, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2013, p. 38. 
Many criticisms are levied against the current ISDS system, an analysis of which is beyond the 
scope of this paper. For an assessment, see M. Bungenberg, “Investment Protection at 
Crossroads”, in J. Auvret-Finck (ed.), Vers un Partenariat Transatlantique de l’Union Européenne, 
Brussels, Larcier, 2015, pp. 125-136. 
31 European Commission, Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, 
op.cit., pp. 9-10. 
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The Union’s legal personality (Article 47 TEU) enables it to conclude international 
agreements in which it confers jurisdiction to courts or tribunals to resolve disputes 
which arise from their application in a manner which is binding for EU institutions, as 
explicitly recognised by the CJEU.32 Nevertheless, in a series of Opinions under Article 
218(11) TFEU, the Court has established stringent limits on its possible modalities in the 
EU.33 Pursuant to Opinions 1/91, 1/92, 1/00, or 1/09, this competence is conditional to 
the dispute-settlement procedure not affecting competence distribution between the 
EU and its member states or between different EU institutions, the autonomy of EU law, 
or the CJEU’s exclusive mandate to guarantee its uniform interpretation and 
application.34 
 
Although arbitral tribunals do not purport to establish binding interpretations of EU law, 
in the CJEU’s view factual spill-overs could occur if EU member states or institutions 
were prevented from implementing measures undertaken in conformity with EU law 
because an international court or tribunal finds that they run counter to obligations 
enshrined in an EU IIA.35 Consequently, the issue of ISDS touches not only upon the 
extent of EU competence under the CCP but, by potentially impacting the autonomy 
of the EU legal order, raises fundamental uncertainties concerning EU ‘constitutional’ 
law.36 In a broad reading of Article 19(1) TEU, the Court has interpreted its own 
competence to interpret and apply EU law as an exclusive one, thus designating itself 
as the sole actor empowered to determine the interaction between EU and 
international law and therefore the admissibility and configuration of ISDS in the EU.37 
The CJEU has conditioned the application of ISDS within the Union to the respect of EU 
competence distribution and to its own monopoly in the interpretation and 
application of EU law.38 This severely limits the possibilities for an independent, efficient 
                                                 
32 Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, op.cit., p. 116; European Court of Justice, Opinion 
1/91, delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the Treaty – Draft 
agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European 
Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 
ECR 1991, I-6079, paras. 39-40; Hindelang, op.cit., p. 190. 
33 Schill, op.cit., pp. 43-44. 
34 Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, op.cit., p. 117; Hindelang, op.cit., p. 190; Schill, 
op.cit., pp. 46-48. 
35 Ibid., p. 50; Strik, op.cit., p. 250. 
36 Schill, op.cit., pp. 39-40. 
37 R. Cafari Panico, “Recent Developments in EU Investment Agreements”, NYU Transnational 
Notes, 14 July 2014; Hindelang, op.cit., pp. 189, 197; Lavranos, “Designing an International”, 
op.cit., p. 206; Schill, op.cit., pp. 40-41. 
38 Ibid., pp. 49, 51, 53. 
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ISDS in future EU IIAs.39 For instance, it would require the CJEU to issue preliminary rulings 
on questions of EU law arising in investment disputes: this would not only defeat the 
purpose of ISDS, as it would ultimately enable the domestic court of one of the parties 
to the dispute to determine the outcome of dispute-settlement cases, but has also 
been explicitly barred by the Court itself. Indeed, it rejects the competence of arbitral 
tribunals to ask for preliminary rulings on the grounds that their independence from 
member state judicial systems and public authorities and the fact that they are not 
bound by CJEU case law or the primacy of EU law imply that they cannot be regarded 
as ordinary courts as defined in Article 267 TFEU.40 
 
By forcing it to adopt substantially different investment protection standards than its 
component states and indeed most nation states, the CJEU could deteriorate the EU’s 
chances of concluding IIAs; by complicating dispute-resolution systems, it could 
decrease legal certainty and raise the costs of dispute settlement, thus discouraging 
investment.41 Moreover, the Court’s position gives rise to significant moral hazard 
concerns by allowing EU member states to argue the non-applicability of an arbitral 
award on the grounds of its incompatibility with EU law.42 
 
The issue of ISDS lays claim to a situation of wide-ranging inter-institutional cacophony 
or incoherence: regardless of the limits established by the CJEU, the Commission 
proposed and the Council and the European Parliament adopted a Regulation to 
allocate financial responsibility between the Union and its member states and to 
                                                 
39 Lavranos, “Designing an International”, op.cit., p. 218; N. Lavranos, “The MOX Plant judgment 
of the ECJ: How exclusive is the jurisdiction of the ECJ?”, European Energy and Environmental 
Law Review, vol. 15, no. 10, 2006, p. 291; Schill, op.cit., p. 43. 
40 Bungenberg & Hobe, op.cit., p. 1628; Burgstaller, op.cit., p. 74; European Court of Justice, 
judgement in Eco Swiss v. Benetton, C-126, 1999, ECR I-3055, para. 34; Hindelang, op.cit., p. 196; 
Lavranos, “Designing an International”, op.cit., pp. 216, 219; H. Lenk, “New Voices: Challenging 
the Notion of Coherence in EU Foreign Investment Policy”, European Journal of Legal Studies, 
vol.8, no. 2, 2015, p. 18; D. Rovetta, “Investment Arbitration in the EU after Lisbon: Selected 
Procedural and Jurisdictional issues”, in M. Bungenberg & C. Herrmann (eds.), Common 
Commercial Policy after Lisbon, Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2013, pp. 227, 231; Schill, 
op.cit., pp. 53-54. 
41 Lavranos, “Designing an International”, op.cit., p. 219. 
42 Ibid., p. 219. 
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address the choice of respondent in ISDS proceedings under EU IIAs.43 This Financial 
Responsibility Regulation is problematic not only due to its technical inconclusiveness 
but also because of its awkward interaction with international law and because it fails 
to address the CJEU’s main reservation with ISDS, namely the possibility of performance 
requirements demanded by an arbitral court. 
 
The Regulation aims to establish consistent rules in order both to protect third-country 
investors from possible harm caused by intra-EU disputes on the allocation of financial 
responsibility, and the EU itself from potential abuse of uncertainties raised by an 
ambiguous distribution of competence by third-country investors but also the EU’s own 
member states.44 Nevertheless, the complex distribution of competences and 
responsibilities in the EU will in practice often render the unambiguous identification of 
a single actor liable for injury to an international investor impossible.45 Moreover, in 
reality it may be difficult to determine whether EU law requires a specific action by a 
member state, for instance if it establishes the need to achieve a particular result but 
does not specify the means in which the latter should be accomplished.46 Union 
responsibility for the actions of member states could thus give rise to moral hazard 
concerns with the latter violating their international obligations and shifting 
responsibility to the EU.47 Furthermore, the fact that proposed settlements, even those 
which concern disputes in which member states are not involved, shall have to be 
approved by a Committee of member state representatives, may increase the risk of 
disputes within the EU itself even after the resolution of the arbitration case, negatively 
impacting the efficiency and cohesion of the EU’s action and giving rise to substantial 
economic costs.48 
                                                 
43 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a framework for managing 
financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by 
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44 Brown & Naglis, op.cit., pp. 32, 34. 
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46 Strik, op.cit., p. 116. 
47 Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, op.cit., p. 341. 
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Moreover, because EU IIAs will in practice mostly be defended by individual member 
states, the Commission shall be obliged to monitor every single one in order to ensure 
the consistent interpretation of EU IIAs and the protection of EU interests.49 In practice 
it may be unable to prevent member states from defending their own line unless it 
initiates infringement proceedings against them post facto (Articles 259-260 TFEU). 
Additionally, questions arise as to the Commission’s technical competence and sheer 
administrative capacity to deal even with the cases which it shall have to defend, let 
alone cope with their financial implications, which arise not only from hefty settlements 
often awarded by arbitration tribunals but also from fees and costs associated with 
the arbitration procedure itself. 
 
In conclusion, it is not only EU constitutional law but also the interpretation made 
thereof which sets limits on its actorness in international investment politics. The fact 
that its legal bases are not as solid as they should be arguably renders the creation of 
a consistent, coherent CIP much more difficult, as will be illustrated forthwith by 
examining the EU’s autonomy and cohesion in this domain. 
 
Autonomy and cohesiveness: from BITs and pieces to a single voice? 
 
The fact that the EU’s competence is limited even at its legal source implies that 
problems arise also in the other facets which make up actorness. Jupille and Caporaso 
differentiate between autonomy and cohesiveness, which are both aspects which 
concern an actor’s practical operationalisation of its competence. In this context, 
institutional autonomy refers to the EU’s ability to independently design and pursue an 
agenda within the limits set by the transfer of legal authority.50 The problems which 
arise in the EU’s CIP as regards its autonomy are illustrated by the negotiation process 
for EU IIAs: the multiplicity of stakeholders with veto power in the policy-making process 
decisively limits the EU’s ability to act autonomously. In its turn, cohesiveness refers to 
the overcoming of internal divergences and agreement on a shared message to 
convey internationally with a single voice.51 As the next session will show, the EU’s policy 
does not reflect a cohesive approach: its actorness is undermined not only by its 
constitutional strictures but also by its own policy. 
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Autonomy: The multi-level game of EU IIAs 
 
The negotiation and conclusion of EU IIAs is conducted in accordance with Articles 
207(3-4) and 218 TFEU and is subject to a process involving the Commission, the 
Council, and the European Parliament.52 According to Article 207(3) TFEU, the 
Commission proposes the opening of negotiations to the Council and represents the 
Union in international negotiations. As the CCP is a field to which the ordinary 
legislative procedure applies, not only the Council but also the European Parliament 
must consent to the conclusion of the negotiated text (Articles 207(2), 218(6)(a)(v) 
TFEU). The Treaties establish a somewhat lopsided attribution of rights to these 
institutions, according to which the Parliament’s formal role is limited to voting the 
agreement up or down whereas the Council is additionally in charge of approving the 
opening of negotiations and issuing the negotiating directives for the Commission 
(Articles 207(3), 218(3-4) TFEU). Similarly, whereas the Commission is obliged to consult 
with the Council, via its Trade Policy Committee (TPC), throughout the negotiation 
process, the Parliament is only kept informed (Article 218(4) and (10) TFEU). 
Nevertheless, in practice both institutions eagerly participate in the negotiation and 
conclusion process for EU IIAs and the Commission is in constant dialogue both with 
the TPC and the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, enabling 
both co-legislators to indicate their preferences for the negotiation.53 The 
Commission’s main incentive to safeguard the co-legislators’ involvement and to 
observe its negotiating directives is to prevent the threat of defection by one of the 
veto players at the moment of ratification of the negotiated outcome.54 
 
Moreover, because EU IIAs are mostly concluded as part of broader mixed 
agreements, their ratification will require the approval of each national parliament 
according to its own specific domestic procedure.55 The set of agreements for which 
the EU could achieve domestic ratification – Putnam’s proverbial ‘win-set’ – may be 
further narrowed by the constitutional strictures and political dynamics of particular 
                                                 
52 Griebel, “The New EU Investment Policy Approach”, op.cit., p. 309. 
53 Brown & Naglis, op.cit., p. 22; Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law, op.cit., p. 138; N. 
Lavranos, “The Remaining Decisive Role of Member States in Negotiating and Concluding EU 
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member states, for instance by the necessity of consent of regional Parliaments in 
federal countries.56 A recent example in this regard is the Walloon Minister-President’s 
announcement that the region’s Parliament – which is just one of six Belgian 
Parliaments which must consent to the ratification of international agreements – would 
not grant the Belgian federal government power to ratify the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in its present form, due 
notably to concerns about the ISDS.57 Furthermore, some member states foresee the 
review of international agreements by their domestic constitutional courts.58 Finally, 
the CJEU is entitled to make the ultimate decision as to the conformity with EU law of 
an EU IIA, although this competence is conditional to the request of an Opinion by a 
member state or by the Council, the Commission, or the European Parliament (Article 
218(11) TFEU). Nevertheless, in light of the diverging interests of stakeholders as to the 
configuration of the CIP, this possibility does not seem far-fetched. 
 
The decision-making process established in the ordinary legislative procedure has 
some undeniable advantages; for instance, by strengthening the European 
Parliament’s role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, it 
increases the political legitimacy of IIAs.59 Nevertheless, this lengthy, complex decision-
making procedure also has a series of drawbacks. For instance, the simultaneous 
elevation of the decision-making process to the EU level and the multiplication of 
actors involved could both distance investment policy-making from relevant 
stakeholders such as investors or civil society, making it less responsive to their input, 
while also rendering it more susceptible to the influence of special-interest groups, 
which might find it less costly to mobilise and undertake collective action to lobby for 
their interests.60 The decision-making process not only makes their adoption process 
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long and uncertain but also risks politicising IIAs, which are becoming increasingly 
controversial and politically salient.61 
 
The need to accommodate the demands not only of different institutions and third-
country counterparties but also of every single EU member state as well as veto players 
within them sets extremely narrow limits to the Union’s ‘win-set’ and will increase 
inflexibility and delays in policy-making.62 Member state leverage vis-à-vis the EU will 
allow them to demand issue-linkages or side-payments, and their diverging interests 
as regards international investment may imply that lowest-common denominator 
decisions prevail or even lead to deadlock within the EU. Particularly because EU IIAs 
are mostly negotiated as component parts of broader agreements, investment 
provisions may become a space for compromise.63 Although such a reduced ‘win-set’ 
domestically could theoretically enhance the EU’s bargaining position internationally, 
in line with theories on the ‘paradox of weakness’ in international negotiations, it is 
unlikely to do so in the case of EU IIA negotiations.64 This is because such agreements 
shall not be negotiated in a vacuum but on the basis of an intricate network of existing 
member state IIAs, whose existence implies that the alternative to an agreement 
negotiated with the EU for third countries – and indeed for EU member states – will 
often not be an absence of protection but agreements in the format of the highly-
protective IIA classically concluded by European states (European IIA).65 
 
Cohesiveness: The subsistence of member state policies 
 
The EU’s actorness in IIA negotiations is not only limited by constitutional constraints set 
by EU primary law; it is also restricted by policies designed and adopted by the EU 
institutions themselves. Three dimensions to this issue can be identified: first, the 
establishment by the EU of interim regimes to deal with transitional issues arising from 
the transfer of competence; second, its approval of the subsistence of certain 
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member state policies; and third, the interaction of EU competence with policies 
which remain under member state jurisdiction. 
 
As regards the first element, the CIP was not created on the basis of a tabula rasa, 
and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon raised the thorny issue of the future of 
existing regulatory frameworks and particularly that of member state bilateral 
investment treaties (BIT), a weighty legacy amounting to over 1,400 individual 
agreements.66 Although the principle of uniform application of EU law made BITs 
concluded by member states with third countries subsequently to their EU accession 
redundant, a pragmatic Commission saw the benefits of maintaining them pending 
the development of a network of EU IIAs. Their conservation would not only ensure 
legal certainty and protection for investors, thereby preventing a possible 
discouragement of international investment, but also ensure coherence with 
international law, under which such BITs remain valid because they were concluded 
with countries not signatories to the Treaty of Lisbon.67 The Commission thus proposed 
a Regulation, agreed upon by the Council and the European Parliament after nearly 
three years of negotiation, which establishes a regime to gradually phase out 
member-state BITs and their capacity to conclude them.68 Under the so-called 
‘Grandfathering’ Regulation, BITs concluded by member states with third countries 
(extra-EU BITs) which have been notified to the Commission generally remain valid until 
a Union-wide agreement with the same third country enters into force, although the 
Commission may in some cases request their termination and member states are 
required to eliminate incompatibilities with EU law therein and ensure that they do not 
obstruct the negotiation or conclusion of EU IIAs.69 What is more, member states may 
amend or even conclude new extra-EU BITs after vetting by the Commission’s new 
Committee for Investment Agreements.70 The Commission may call for the inclusion of 
specific provisions or standard clauses such as transfer or termination provisions or a 
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most-favoured nation (MFN) clause to extend the benefits of a member state BIT to 
the entirety of EU investors.71 
 
Second, and in an approach which might be labelled as pragmatic, the EU has 
allowed for the endurance of certain aspects of member state investment policies. 
For instance, whereas the EU’s competence over FDI regulation extends to investment 
promotion, member states will be permitted to maintain investment promotion 
schemes in parallel to EU ones as long as they do not contradict Union policy.72 The 
most important example of such schemes is investment insurance, an area in which 
most member states possess well-established policy frameworks which aim to 
encourage outward investment.73 State-sponsored insurance covers risks which in 
contrast to many commercial and natural dangers are not insured by private 
insurance firms, for instance “riots, civil war, terrorism, currency risks, expropriation […] 
breaches of contracts and non-honouring of sovereign financial obligations”.74 The EU 
has until now not provided answers to questions related to their complementation or 
replacement by an EU-wide scheme and plays only a supervisory role in this field.75 
 
Third, investment touches in practice upon a panoply of policy areas which remain 
under national or at most shared competence. They include fiscal, labour, or 
procedural law; property ownership and industrial relations systems; or environmental, 
health, and social policies.76 Because EU primary law does not confer competence on 
the EU to circumscribe governments’ ability to legislate in such domains, the Treaty of 
Lisbon has not eliminated substantive inequality or the hazard of arbitration between 
member state regulatory systems. This issue is particularly crucial because such 
standards are often the ones upon which investors challenge states for breaches of 
IIA provisions.77 
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In the construction of the CIP, the EU is hence limited by a series of factors: the fact 
that the principle of conferral of competences (Article 5.1 TEU) limits its engagement 
in certain policy areas, together with the lack of provisions in the Treaties as to the 
transition to a common policy, and the necessity to phase out a vast web of finely-
honed member state investment policies.78 Consequently, the EU has been compelled 
to adopt a pragmatic, ad hoc approach in the construction of the CIP, based on 
individual inter-institutional secondary EU law compromises in parallel to individual 
investment negotiations. However, this approach leaves many important issues 
unresolved and has also arguably aggravated existing problems. 
 
As regards the ‘Grandfathering’ Regulation, although it complies with the pacta sunt 
servanda principle and permits member states to pursue IIA negotiations with 
countries to which they ascribe a higher priority than the EU, it has, in utter contrast to 
its stated intentions, arguably created legal uncertainty for investors because it does 
not resolve but rather procrastinates definite decisions on the design of the EU’s new 
competence, focussing on short-term attempts to bridge gaps which prolong an 
already uncertain state of flux.79 By placing member states between the ‘rock’ of 
renegotiating their extra-EU BITs and the ‘hard place’ of being subject to a request to 
terminate such agreements outright or to judicial procedures within the EU, the 
Commission could decrease member states’ leverage in negotiations with third 
countries, worsening their bargaining position in the amendment of extra-EU BITs. 
Moreover, the Regulation does not resolve the considerable problem of BITs 
concluded between EU member states. Additionally, the Regulation reflects an 
introspective approach of doubtful practicability: for instance, whereas an MFN 
clause in extra-EU BITs would eliminate inequality between EU investors, it is unlikely to 
be accepted by third countries, as it would give rise to an unequal situation in which 
third-country investors would be protected only in the member state with which their 
home state had concluded the BIT, whereas all EU investors would benefit from 
investment protection.80 
 
The decision to maintain national policies such as investment insurance mechanisms 
financed and administered at a national level is even more problematic. This 
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approach may respond to difficulties in designing and financing a common 
investment insurance scheme for all EU member states and may be justified also on 
the grounds of the principle of subsidiarity.81 Moreover, it may represent an attempt 
by the EU to maintain competition between member states, thus encouraging an 
optimisation of investment insurance design and coverage. Nevertheless, the lack of 
common guidelines on investment insurance may lead to a ‘race’ of subsidies 
between member states, giving rise to competitive distortions and legal uncertainty.82 
Ultimately, the decision to phase out some member state competences whilst 
maintaining others lays claim to an approach which is not only incoherent internally 
but also vis-à-vis international actors and which prevents the development of a 
cohesive EU voice in the international investment regime.83 Indeed, initiatives such as 
the maintenance of member state investment insurance schemes or the approval of 
new extra-EU member state BITs are likely to increase regulatory competition between 
them, weakening cohesiveness and, by offering member states and third countries an 
attractive alternative to potential EU IIAs, possibly hindering the negotiation of the 
latter. 
 
Moreover, on the grounds that it would reduce its flexibility in negotiations, and despite 
the European Parliament’s calls for the EU to design one, the Commission has actively 
rejected the key mechanism for increasing consistency and accountability in 
international investment negotiations, a Model IIA which could serve as their 
standardised foundation.84 A Model IIA is necessary not only to ensure transparency 
but also to ensure the consistent interpretation and application of its IIAs at the 
national and subnational level.85 Furthermore, it would guarantee that IIAs are drafted 
with high technical standards and allow for consistency across negotiations, and 
strengthen the EU’s bargaining position by establishing clear guide and red lines.86 
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All in all, the EU’s actorness in the international investment regime is weakened not only 
by legal constraints which affect its autonomy, but also by its own operationalisation 
of the policy. Indeed, the maintenance of different levels of policy-making has the 
potential to create legal uncertainty and, especially given the lack of an EU Model IIA 
to structure negotiations, lead to wasted resources, duplication of efforts, and 
inconsistency across negotiations which may decrease the EU’s credibility as an 
international actor. 
 
Recognition: the elephant in the room 
 
The last element of actorness identified by Jupille and Caporaso is recognition. The 
EU’s actorness is also limited in this regard: although its legal personality is confirmed in 
Article 47 TEU, the EU is only partially recognised as an actor in the international 
investment regime.87 Its actorness is thus not limited only by restrictions internal to the 
EU – linked to its legal competence, institutional autonomy, and cohesiveness – but 
also by external limitations.88 In this context, one can distinguish between problems 
which the EU encounters finding a place within the international investment regime 
and issues arising from the interaction between EU law and international law. 
 
The EU within the international investment regime 
 
The challenge that the EU’s recognition encounters in the international investment 
regime can again be exemplified by its participation in the ISDS system. Indeed, its 
actorness in this domain is structurally limited not only by EU law but also by 
international law. Unsurprisingly, the most important challenges for the EU in this regard 
come from the fact that it is not a state. This implies that it cannot become party to 
the crucial instrument ensuring full recompense to investors, the New York 
Convention.89 Moreover, it means that it cannot become a member of the sole 
institutionalised arbitration mechanism designed specifically for international 
investment disputes, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).90 As ICSID arbitration is available only where an investor’s home and host states 
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are parties to its Convention, the EU will not be able to make use of it in future EU IIAs.91 
Nevertheless, the fact that EU IIAs shall in practice be concluded as mixed agreements 
implies that the EU will be able to make indirect use of ICSID arbitration in the areas of 
the agreement covered by mixed competence: foreign investors from states which 
are ICSID members shall be able to bring claims against member states which are 
equally members of ICSID, albeit not against the EU itself.92 As all EU member states 
except Poland are parties to its Convention, ICSID arbitration will in fact be broadly 
applicable.93 
 
The interaction between EU and international law 
 
The interaction between EU and international law is more problematic, and indeed, 
the secondary law inter-institutional compromises agreed upon to date attest to an 
introspective EU approach which is in some respects in direct conflict with international 
law. Previous sections of this paper touched upon the Financial Responsibility 
Regulation, which is problematic because the EU, as an international organisation to 
which its member states have conferred powers, is in some cases internationally 
responsible for acts of its member states which run counter to the obligations assumed 
under IIAs, even those to which the Union is not party and despite the Regulation’s 
explicit inclusion of a provision stating its inapplicability in the case of member state 
BITs.94 As IIAs cover all measures which affect investment adopted by local, regional, 
or national governments, including areas which remain under exclusive member state 
competence, this question is not just academic.95 
 
Important problems arise also as regards the ‘Grandfathering’ Regulation, particularly 
because it does not cover the approximately 190 intra-EU BITs in force today. These 
are agreements concluded between EU member states, mostly before the accession 
                                                 
91 Gaffney & Akçay, op.cit., p. 190; Hoffmeister & Ünüvar, op.cit., p. 76. 
92 Cafari Panico, op.cit. 
93 Brown & Naglis, op.cit., p. 19; Hoffmeister & Ünüvar, op.cit., p. 76. 
94 Brown & Naglis, op.cit., p. 29; Cafari Panico, op.cit.; Regulation 912/2014, establishing a 
framework for managing financial responsibility linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement 
tribunals established by international agreements to which the European Union is party, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 257, 28 August 2014, art. 1; Strik, op.cit., p. 114. For an 
assessment of the EU’s international responsibility for its member states’ actions, see G. Gaja, 
“Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations”, United Nations Audiovisual Library 
of International Law, 9 December 2011. 
95 Chase, op.cit., p. 7. 
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of at least one of them to the Union.96 They exemplify many of the legal problems 
which arise from the interaction of EU and member state investment policies. First, they 
conflict with the exclusive Union competence for FDI.97 Second, substantive 
guarantees and protection standards in intra-EU BITs are higher than those guaranteed 
by EU law; this gives rise to discrimination between investors on the grounds of 
nationality and has the potential to create distortive impacts on investment flows 
within the internal market.98 Third, intra-EU BITs grant investors access to ISDS arbitration: 
this not only implies differential – and thus discriminatory – treatment to that afforded 
to investors from other EU member states, but also conflicts with the EU law obligation 
to exhaust local remedies in member state courts and undermines the CJEU’s exclusive 
authority to interpret and apply EU law.99 Fourth, they allow investors to ‘treaty-shop’ 
or ‘forum-shop’ between member state and EU investment policies and between 
investment arbitration and national courts.100 
 
Nevertheless, this issue has proven divisive among member states: to date, only those 
which are handling many BIT claims have been receptive to the Commission’s 
reiterated demands to terminate them.101 In contrast, capital-exporting member 
states are reluctant to renounce the favourable conditions enshrined in intra-EU BITs.102 
Their divergent interests mean that member states are far from having an aligned 
position on the validity of intra-EU BITs and particularly their ISDS clauses.103 
 
The different approach taken by the EU as regards intra- and extra-EU BITs has a 
seemingly obvious reason: whereas intra-EU BITs are a purely internal matter, extra EU-
BITs involve third countries which, not being signatories to the Treaty of Lisbon, should 
not be affected by its entry into force.104 Nevertheless, in stark contrast to EU law, from 
an international law perspective, intra-EU BITs, as international treaties concluded by 
                                                 
96 Bungenberg & Hobe, op.cit., p. 1606; Gaffney & Akçay, op.cit., p. 193; Lenk, op.cit., p. 10; A. 
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Commercial Policy after Lisbon, Berlin and Heidelberg, Springer, 2013, p. 238. 
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258. 
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sovereign states, are not automatically superseded by the Treaty of Lisbon but remain 
valid until their formal termination, although the Treaty does divest member states of 
the competence to conclude new intra-EU BITs.105 Indeed, different arbitral tribunals, 
for instance in Eastern Sugar, Binder, EUREKO, or AES, have rejected the notion that EU 
law automatically invalidates BITs between EU member states as well as the CJEU’s 
interpretative monopoly over EU law.106 
 
Overall, the Commission’s support for the inclusion of ISDS provisions in EU IIAs and 
opposition to such provisions in intra-EU BITs testifies to an approach which centres 
mostly on intra-EU policy issues to the expense of investors which currently profit from 
intra-EU BITs.107 For instance, arbitration in intra-EU BITs, while disallowed by EU law, may 
be a useful tool to prevent unequal treatment of EU citizens on the grounds of their 
nationality by different member state judiciaries.108 Furthermore, a termination of intra-
EU BITs would disadvantage EU investors vis-à-vis third-country investors, who benefit 
from higher levels of protection under member state and EU IIAs than those afforded 
to EU investors under internal market law. 
 
Consequently, the problems which arise in the interaction between EU primary and 
secondary law and established international investment law and frameworks imply 
that, even if the EU were able to solve the problems related to the internal distribution 
of competences, its actorness in international investment politics would still be subject 
to structural constraints in what might be termed a systemic incoherence within 
existing international frameworks. This not only limits the modalities of EU participation 
in the latter but also undermines the EU’s attractiveness as a partner with which to 
conclude IIAs. 
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Conclusion: the birth of a (Pastis) power 
 
The creation of the CIP is the latest step in a historical process extending EU 
competences under the CCP in line with the evolving trade agenda and the 
deepening EU integration process. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s competence to 
regulate investment internally, principally via the TFEU’s provisions on capital 
movement and establishment in the internal market, was complemented by an 
explicit external competence which has been understood to be comprehensive but 
not always exclusive.109 With the Europeanisation of the last broad category of 
economic policy-making which remained under national competence, the Treaty 
aimed to streamline the multiplicity of EU primary law provisions which previously 
touched upon the regulation of international investment, reducing ambiguity as to the 
distribution of competences and allowing for a number of benefits which would 
increase its ability to conclude favourable IIAs and act efficiently in the international 
investment arena.110 
 
The political economy perspective adopted in this paper paints a more nuanced 
picture of the competence transfer. Ultimately, the distribution of competences 
enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon does not suffice to create an efficient, coherent CIP 
which would enable the EU to be an independent player in the international 
investment regime.111 The ambiguous wording of the Treaty itself fundamentally 
circumscribes the EU’s legal competence and implies that the main problem of the 
pre-Lisbon distribution of investment policy competences within the EU, the 
fragmentation which implied that neither the Union nor its member states were 
competent to negotiate IIAs as comprehensive as other actors’ unilaterally, has not 
been eliminated. 
 
By imposing mixity in international negotiations, the post-Lisbon set-up increases the 
number of veto players in the decision-making process for EU international agreements 
comprising investment provisions. This renders the development of a truly autonomous 
EU international investment policy very complicated, as is evident by the many 
disputes which remain among EU institutions and member states as to the scope and 
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configuration of the CIP.112 Questions arise as to the EU’s capacity to negotiate 
favourable IIAs in a context in which it has not even decided how to structure its own 
competence internally. 
 
Moreover, despite the prolific policy and academic debates on the substantive 
design of the CIP, the CJEU’s position as ‘constitutional’ EU court has already defined 
many of the parameters of the new policy.113 In this context, the CJEU’s pending 
Opinion on competence distribution in the conclusion of the EU-Singapore FTA may 
have trailblazing consequences for the understanding of the EU’s competence.114 It is 
important to mention in this respect, however, that the Commission and the co-
legislators seem to be paying little heed to limits established by the CJEU in the 
negotiation of EU IIAs and the adoption of secondary legislation. 
 
Overall, intra-EU quarrels over competence and competing tactics and visions for the 
CIP give rise to legal uncertainty, lessen the EU’s attractiveness for investors and third 
countries, and ultimately imply that the EU’s actorness is not only limited by EU law 
provisions and by their interpretation by the CJEU but also by the EU’s own 
implementation of its new competence. Furthermore, the creation of new frameworks 
in which member state policies interact with EU policies, far from simplifying 
procedures and clarifying the transition to the CIP, adds yet another layer of 
complexity and overlapping rights and obligations, increasing legal uncertainty. This 
also implies that regulatory competition is an issue not only internationally but likely to 
subsist within the EU itself. Indeed, the EU’s procrastination of definite decisions on 
many normative concerns and structural issues lengthens the uncertain transitional 
phase to the CIP and seems to be actively hampering the development of a cohesive 
policy.115 
 
Finally, the fact that the EU is only partially recognised as an international actor within 
the international investment regime implies that its actorness would be circumscribed 
even if it were able to deal with its internal problems, in what one might term systemic 
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incoherence of the EU within the existing institutional frameworks and legal structures 
of the international investment regime. Particularly the fact that the CIP is not being 
constructed in a vacuum, but on the basis of hundreds of member state IIAs which will 
serve as an attractive alternative to potential EU IIAs, decreases the EU’s leverage over 
third countries. It also implies that EU IIAs shall only be acceptable to third countries 
and each and every member state, if they include more favourable provisions than 
any of their respective BITs, a condition which in practice seems extremely difficult to 
achieve. 
 
This paper’s findings suggest that the transfer of competence over FDI to the EU is 
unlikely to give rise in the international investment landscape to a situation which 
resembles the configuration in the international trading system. Far from increasing the 
international competitiveness of the EU’s economy and regulatory system, the 
inclusion of investment provisions may jeopardise the ratification of the broader trade 
and international agreements in which they are usually incorporated. Consequently, 
the EU’s attempt to include investment concerns in its external economic policy-
making may not only lack a positive impact on the EU’s position in international 
investment but perversely even decrease its influence in the broader international 
economic arena. 
 
In this context, the EU’s decision to countenance the conclusion of new extra-EU 
member state BITs might be regarded as testament to its recognition that such 
agreements are the most feasible form for the EU to conclude IIAs and maintain the 
competitiveness of its firms. A probable result of the post-Lisbon status quo for 
international investment policy is thus one in which the EU focusses on negotiating IIAs 
with strategic countries while permitting its member states to continue to bargain with 
the ‘small fish’. This approach is consistent with the Commission’s explicit prioritisation 
of negotiations with such economies since its 2006 Communication on the EU’s trade 
strategy and with individual policy initiatives, such as its 2012 development, together 
with the USA, of a ‘blueprint’ establishing standards to guide 21st century international 
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investment politics, which can be read as an attempt to increase their joint influence 
in the international investment architecture.116 
 
The EU’s present unenviable position in international investment politics belies 
conceptualisations which describe it as a ‘market power’ and serves as yet another 
confirmation of the oft-cited maxim that there is no ‘free lunch’ in economics.117 In 
these early stages of the CIP, the EU seems to be something of a conflicted, ‘diluted’ 
‘Pastis power’ which is unsure of what to do with a competence which the Commission 
spent decades trying to achieve. Although the transfer of competence over FDI to the 
world’s largest economic bloc will doubtless give rise to systemic shifts not only 
internally within the EU but also but also in the international investment regime more 
generally, uncertainties surrounding the final configuration of the CIP denote that it is 
too early to say whether they shall be to the benefit of the EU.118 Many open questions 
remain and offer rich soil for research: how shall the EU address inward investment by 
state-owned bodies such as state-owned enterprises or sovereign wealth funds? How 
shall it prevent unequal treatment for EU and international investors who wish to place 
capital within the EU? How to balance the roles of different EU institutions, the 
imperative to guarantee not only ‘free’ but also ‘fair’ trade, and the interests of capital 
importing and capital exporting member states? In any event, the complex decision-
making dynamics which characterise the Union and the Herculean task with which it 
is faced in the replacement of existing regulatory frameworks imply that the scope 
and configuration of the CIP are not likely to be settled any time soon and that the 
transitional period to a common policy is likely to be a very lengthy one. 
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